

POLICY OUTREACH: STRATEGIES & CHALLENGES

February 3, 2022

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Center for Global Development

- I. About Policy Outreach
- II. Tracking developments in relevant policy areas
- III. Developing accessible materials for policymakers
- IV. Strategies for building allies
- V. Establishing researchers as go-to experts
- VI. Encouraging researchers to be both patient and persistent

About Policy Outreach

Overarching Objectives

Key Functions

Complementary Roles

Tracking
developments in
relevant policy
areas

Systems for monitoring

Flagging items for individual researchers

Weekly staff-wide update email

Reply all | Delete | Junk | Block

GD Weekly Policy Update

 Grin Collinson (ecollinson@CGDEV.ORG)
Mon 9/1/2023 6:14 PM
To: CGD Announce <CGDAnnounce@CGDEV.ORG>
Cc: Jocelyn Estes (jestes@CGDEV.ORG)

EVENTS

September 15: [International Day of Democracy](#)
September 14-20: [UN General Assembly](#)
September 21: [International Day of Peace](#)
September 30: [Top of US Fiscal Year 2024](#)

US CONGRESS

Lawmakers are returning to Washington to face a slew of pressing deadlines. The current fiscal year expires at the end of the month, meaning both chambers will need to agree to a continuing resolution in order to avoid a government shutdown. Meanwhile, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen [has been urging](#) Congress to address the debt limit, which was reinstated at the beginning of August. And—of course—Democratic leaders in the House hope to advance both a bipartisan infrastructure deal and an ambitious “Build Back Better” reconciliation package in the coming weeks.

House

The House isn’t scheduled to return to session until September 20, but **committees continue work on sections of the Democrats’ budget reconciliation measure this week.** House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD) has indicated he hopes the chamber can act to pass a stopgap funding measure next week.

Senate

The Senate recovered at 5pm. Senate Foreign Relations Chair Bob Menendez (D-NJ) [linked to the floor](#) this evening to voice concerns about vacancies in key positions with implications for Afghanistan and Haiti. The Senate confirmed, by voice vote, **Brian Nichols to be Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Brett Holmgren to be Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, and Donald Lu to be Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs.** Menendez also sought unanimous consent to confirm **Marcelo Escobar to be USAID Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean**, but the motion was blocked by Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX).

Hearings/Markup/Executive Meetings

Monday

Secretary of State Antony Blinken [testified before](#) the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the **US withdrawal from Afghanistan**.

The House Judiciary Committee [marked up its portion](#) of the budget reconciliation package, which includes a plan to **streamline, individuals eligible for Temporary Protected Status (TPS), or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), and certain essential workers to apply for permanent residency** in the United States. Provisions in the measure will also **recapture a number of unused (previously expired) immigrant visas**—and ensure they don’t expire in the future. It would also give diversity winners denied entry between 2017 and 2021—whether due to COVID or the Trump administration’s Muslim ban another shot at entry. These provisions are very likely to change if the measure moves forward in the Senate—and Democrats’ ability to advance their immigration policy reforms through budget reconciliation will ultimately depend on a favorable reading by the Senate parliamentarian. She has [previously ruled](#) for additional information. (For more, check out this helpful [blog post](#) from the American Immigration Council.)

Tuesday

Lawmakers on the House Ways and Means Committee **will continue their markup of portions of the Democratic budget reconciliation package**, including infrastructure bond programs and incentives for clean energy. A new subtitle released earlier today [outlines](#) a variety of “pay-fors” including an **increase in the corporate tax rate, new treatment of cryptocurrency, and changes in tax policy on certain tobacco products.**

Secretary Blinken is scheduled to [appear](#) again on **Afghanistan withdrawal policies**—this time before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

“**Changing Dynamics in the South China Sea**” is the title of a House Foreign Affairs Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation Subcommittee [hearing](#).

Wednesday

Juliana Noyes, nominated to serve as **Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration**, and Denise Bauer, nominated to serve concurrently as Ambassador to France and Monaco, are scheduled to speak at a Senate Foreign Relations [nominations hearing](#).

A second Senate Foreign Relations [nominations hearing](#) will feature **Sheba Crocker**, nominated to be **US Representative to the UN and other international organizations in Geneva**, among others.

The Senate Banking Committee will [convene in executive session](#) to vote on several pending nominees, including **Brian Eddie Nelson** (Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Crimes) and **Elizabeth Rosenberg** (Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing).

Other

House Foreign Affairs Ranking Member Michael McCaul (R-TX) [wrote to](#) USAID Administrator Samantha Power with questions intended to assess the **agency’s operations and role in policy deliberations in Afghanistan leading up to the US withdrawal** from the country.

Representative Ann Wagner (R-MO) [called on](#) the State Department to **investigate reports of forced marriage of Afghan girls among the refugees evacuated by the US government.**

Senators Bob Casey (D-PA), Sherrod Brown (D-OH), and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) wrote to US Trade Representative Katherine Tai requesting the administration [conduct a review](#) of China trade policy and rules related to content from non-market economies.

A congressional delegation [will visit](#) Lebanon, Israel, West Bank, Tunisia, and Greece to discuss US engagement in the region.

[In a letter](#) to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), Senate Foreign Relations Ranking Member Jim Risch (R-ID) and Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Ranking Member Richard Burr (R-NC) requested a report on **US oversight of federally funded international biological research.**

Senate Foreign Relations Chair Bob Menendez (D-NJ) and European counterparts [will resume](#) the start of **negotiations in Venezuela.**

ADMINISTRATION

President Biden [announced](#) new efforts to [speed up the pardons](#) and increase COVID-19 vaccination domestically.

[According to the Washington Post](#), the Biden administration has invited world leaders, international organizations, and others to attend the “**Global COVID-19 Summit: Ending the Pandemic and Building Back Better**” on September 22. [Draft language](#) obtained by The Post requests participants to commit to a set of **ambitious shared targets**.

On September 24, the **White House plans to host leaders of the Quad**—Australia, India, and Japan—to discuss the climate crisis, combatting COVID-19, among other issues.

The Departments of State and Homeland Security [announced](#) that new applications for the Central American Minors program will be accepted starting September 14.

The White House released a [fact sheet](#) on the US-Mexico High-Level Economic Dialogue and published a [press release](#) on the initiative’s relaunch.

The administration is [apparently](#) considering new industrial tariffs on China.

US Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry is [working today](#) this week to discuss reducing emissions and cooperation on other climate goals.

Biden [quits with](#) Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The State Department [released a statement](#) denying ongoing human rights abuses in the conflict in Ethiopia.

USAID [activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team](#) to coordinate efforts in Afghanistan. The agency [also announced](#) \$64 million in new humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.

A delegation from MCC [visited Nepal](#) to discuss steps toward rectification of a \$500 million compact.

Nominations/Staffing/Appointments

The White House [announced six new nominations](#), including two Commerce undersecretary nominees—**Marisa Lago** (International Trade) and **Ind Koker** (Economic Affairs)—and USF’s chief agricultural negotiator, **Haima Trevino**.

DIC [announced](#) **Lauren Cochran** will serve as the agency’s Vice President of Equity and Investment Funds.

OTHER HEADLINES

The Global Fund [released a report](#) on the impact of the pandemic on HIV, tuberculosis and malaria programs.

The UN [convened an aid conference in Geneva today](#) in an effort to raise more than \$600 million for Afghanistan. The UN [announced](#) this afternoon it had already secured more than \$3.2 billion in pledges.

Sima Sami is [the new](#) Executive Director of UN Women.

What methods or resources does your organization use for helping researchers keep track of the latest policy developments and happenings?

Developing accessible materials for policymakers

Encouraging researchers to draft blog posts summarizing papers and highlighting policy recommendations where relevant

Publishing informative briefs on key institutions designed with a US target audience in mind

Managing production of a briefing book ahead of key elections



THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE WORLD

Practical Proposals for
Resetting US Engagement
in Developing Countries

2020 Briefing Book



ABCs of the IFIs: The World Bank

The World Bank is a multilateral organization that provides financial and technical assistance to developing countries. As the World Bank's largest shareholder, the United States maintains a unique influence in shaping its agenda and has a vested interest in ensuring the institution is well managed and appropriately resourced. The US Congress has an important role both in funding US contributions to the World Bank and in overseeing US participation in the institution. Past congressional decisions tied to US funding have led to changes in World Bank policies and institutional reforms.

Several inflection points warrant increased congressional attention to the World Bank. The general capital increase agreement formalized in October 2016—a multilateral commitment to increase contributions from all bank shareholders (including the US) to enable more lending by the bank—is one such point. This agreement requires congressional authorization and the appropriation of new contributions, which will mainly benefit the middle-income and lower-middle income country recipients of the bank's lending. A second opportunity centers on replenishing the bank's soft lending window for fiscal years 2021 through 2023, which will primarily benefit low-income countries. The IDA16 pledging session will take place in December, and Congress will be called upon to appropriate funding to enable the US to fulfill its commitment.

THE WORLD BANK GROUP

The World Bank Group is made up of five entities with complementary roles in promoting global economic development. The International Development Association (IDA) provides grants and low-cost loans to low-income countries. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) plays a similar role but provides loans to middle-income countries. Select credit-

worthy low-income countries are eligible for a blend of assistance from IBRD and IDA. To account for the differences in recipient country incomes, IBRD loans typically cost more than IDA loans; however, both offer more favorable terms than private sector lending.

The World Bank Group also comprises three other organizations: the International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides loans to private companies, as opposed to sovereign nations, in the developing world. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) provides guarantees to private investors who lend to the developing world, incentivizing risk-averse companies and individuals to invest in developing markets. Finally, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) acts as a third-party dispute settlement recourse for investors and sovereign nations, to promote international investment by increasing confidence in an impartial dispute resolution process.

The IBRD is the bank's hard lending window. It borrows on international capital markets at attractive rates and lends to emerging market economies, charging a slight premium to cover the World Bank's operating expenses and to generate funds for other purposes, including grants to poorer countries.

IDA, the World Bank's soft lending window, provides grants and highly concessional loans (with low interest rates and long repayment periods) to the world's poorest countries, whose annual per capita incomes fall below an established threshold (\$1,145 in FY2019). It is one of


CGD BRIEF
JUNE 2019



US Foreign Assistance Agency Briefs: Introduction

The US Development Policy Initiative at the Center for Global Development launched the Foreign Assistance Agency Briefs for a simple reason. Foreign assistance is in the spotlight, slated for significant budget cuts during the Trump administration, yet it remains poorly understood. The series of five briefs contained here provides a snapshot of the primary US foreign assistance agencies. And while these agencies implement nearly 90 percent of US development and humanitarian assistance, there are 20 agencies in total that implement aid-related programs.¹ Additionally, the United States has the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which does not manage foreign assistance funds but uses other tools to catalyze private investment in developing countries.

Figure 1: Implementation of US Foreign Assistance, FY2015²



Note: OPIC does not implement grant-based foreign assistance

Three Essential Questions for US Foreign Assistance

Beyond getting the numbers right, there is a need to present a clear picture of US foreign assistance and answer essential questions of mission, effectiveness, and reform.

- What are we trying to achieve through foreign assistance?
- How well are we doing it?
- How could we deliver foreign assistance better?

1. WBID, "What is IDA? Borrowing Countries"

How do you ensure the work you publish is accessible to policymaking audiences?

Strategies for building allies

Identifying advocacy organizations with shared values or interests

Participating in networks with overlapping interests

Creating joint products and co-hosting events

Convening a “working group”

Hosting one-year policy fellows

Report of the Group of Experts on Labor Mobility and Migration Policy Development Working Group

Making Markets for Vaccines

Ideas to action



Shared Border, Shared Future

A Blueprint to Regulate US-Mexico Labor Mobility



Carlos Gutierrez and Ernesto Zedillo,
co-chairs of the Working Group
Michael A. Clemens, lead author

MFAN MODERNIZING FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE NETWORK

IFI Working Group

How have you identified and cultivated allies in your work to shape policy reform?

Establishing researchers as go-to experts


Identifying timely hooks for commentary and analysis

Benefiting from the work of communications colleagues pursuing media coverage

Sending “advance copies” of potentially relevant publications

Facilitating briefings or meetings to discuss new research

Ensuring timely responses to inquiries and requests for technical assistance



What strategies have helped you establish your researchers as key experts for policymakers?

Encouraging
researchers to be
both patient and
persistent in their
policy engagement

Recommend fellows return to past policy recommendations regularly

Publishing new analysis or commentary can give new life to a proposal that previously failed to gain traction

Changing political contexts can present opportunities or roadblocks and sometimes necessitate a shift in target and adjustments in framing



Draft Proposal

A Consolidated U.S. Development Bank: Reorganizing Private Sector Policy Tools in Emerging Markets and Fragile States

Todd Moss & Benjamin Leo
April 6, 2011

"We need to think bigger... my administration will... merge, consolidate, and reorganize the federal government in a way that best serves the goal of a more competitive America."

-President Obama, SOTU, January 25, 2011

BACKGROUND: Promoting the private sector in low-income and fragile countries clearly supports U.S. national security. First, it creates commercial opportunities for American firms by building markets abroad. Second, it enables countries to meet their own needs and challenges without relying upon foreign assistance in the future. It is a win-win approach. The U.S. Government currently has a large number of existing tools, policy options, and institutions to encourage entrepreneurship and commercial activity abroad. To date, these tools – technical assistance, credit lines, seed capital, and other mechanisms – have not been deployed in an efficient or strategic manner. The fragmentation of effort and lack of cohesion across multiple agencies means that the sum of these parts is far less than optimal. These inefficiencies imply that the U.S. is: (1) losing out on potential commercial opportunities in the next wave of emerging markets; and (2) neglecting a key lever to support stability and prosperity abroad. While the Obama Administration currently is focused on consolidating the various export promotion agencies, an equally compelling case applies to the USG's various international agencies and programs focused on promoting private sector-based development abroad.

A cohesive USG effort to promote the private sector – deploying existing tools at no additional budget cost – could be especially useful in support of:

- (1) **Non-Aid Tools in Emerging Economies.** Growing middle-income markets (e.g., India, Thailand, Turkey, Nigeria, and Mexico) neither need nor desire major non-military U.S. aid. In these countries, promoting prosperity and stability is in large part expanding markets and economic opportunities for the rising middle and entrepreneurial classes. These are better achieved by using public sector tools to crowd-in private capital such as risk guarantees, seed debt capital, trade finance, or facilitating new private equity funds.
- (2) **Fragile or Frontline States.** In countries facing complex governance or security challenges (e.g., Afghanistan, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Zimbabwe), the U.S. and other donors typically concentrate activities on delivering basic services and humanitarian relief. Projects to promote investment and encourage entrepreneurial activity are a necessary component for rebuilding these traumatized societies by creating jobs, economic opportunities, and tax revenues. Indeed, private sector growth is the only long-term sustainable route for such countries to make the transition from dependency and poverty to self-sufficiency and middle-class status.
- (3) **Special U.S. Initiatives: Food Security, Clean Energy, African Infrastructure.** The White House has committed to promote food security (e.g., Feed the Future) and the development of clean energy for developing countries. Future commitments via the G-20, such as spurring investment in much-needed African regional infrastructure, also may soon be in the pipeline. Budget conditions make major public sector outlays unlikely, adding urgency to drawing in private investment. However, the existing facilities are each stand-alone and not packaged in a manner to help support these initiatives. Currently, many of these also are under increased congressional pressure, which is making them risk-averse and even less creative in supporting wider U.S. policy goals.

March 2015



Rethinking US Development Policy

Bringing US Development Finance into the 21st Century: Proposal for a Self-Sustaining, Full-Service USDFC

Benjamin Leo and Todd Moss

March 2015

Summary

The imperative for US development finance has increased significantly due to a number of factors over the last decade. There is growing demand for private investment and finance from businesses, citizens, and governments in developing countries. Given the scale of challenges and opportunities, especially in promoting infrastructure investments and expanding productive sectors, there is an increasingly recognized need to promote private sector-based solutions. Well-established European development finance institutions (DFIs) now provide integrated services for businesses that cover debt and equity financing, risk mitigation, and technical assistance. Many of their governments have embraced financially self-sustaining approaches to promoting development outcomes, which impose no net costs on taxpayers. Separately, several emerging market actors – including China, India, Brazil, and Malaysia – have dramatically increased financing activities in a number of developing regions, such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. This also includes the establishment of several new large multilateral financing institutions, such as the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In contrast, existing US development finance efforts have not been deployed in an efficient or strategic manner due to outdated authorities, insufficient staff resources, and dispersion of tools across a broad number of government agencies. The US government's primary development finance vehicle is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), which provides investors with debt financing, loan guarantees, political risk insurance, and support for private equity investment funds. However, with few exceptions, OPIC has not evolved since its establishment in 1971. Beyond OPIC, there are a number of other modest programs within US aid agencies, such as USAID's Development Credit Authority, USAID's enterprise funds, and US Trade and Development Agency's feasibility studies and technical assistance.

Within this context, we assess the need for a US Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) and provide a series of options for how it could be structured in a manner consistent with bipartisan congressional support. This includes an overview of existing US government institutions and programs that support private sector-based development approaches, including any gaps or redundancies across them. With respect to the proposed DFC, we focus on several core issues, including: (1) products, services, and tools; (2) size, scale, and staffing requirements; (3) governance structure as well as oversight and accountability functions; (4) performance metrics; and (5) capital structure and financial sustainability models. Finally, we conclude with a national implementation roadmap that includes the required US executive and legislative actions.



Ben Leo is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Rethinking US Development Policy initiative at the Center for Global Development. Todd Moss is a Senior Fellow and Chief Operating Officer at the Center for Global Development. CDD is grateful for contributions from its funders, including the William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, in support of this work. The authors are thankful for input and comments on earlier drafts of this paper from Dan Bantz, George Ingram, John Iken, and several anonymous reviewers. The authors are solely responsible for any errors in fact or judgment.

November 2018



July 2016 &
Nov 2017

DFC's Origin Story

April 2011

Have you found success in shaping policy by refreshing or revisiting research and policy proposals at a later date?

What other strategies or approaches can help support efforts to inform policy?